Delaying claiming past the early eligibility age of 62 has taken on increased importance.
Introduction
Individuals who are at least 62 years old and eligible for Social Security face an important decision each month: should they claim their retirement benefits immediately or delay claiming and earn a greater monthly benefit later? While delaying claiming has many advantages, it may feel like an economic impossibility for individuals who have lost a job or whose household income and wealth are low. At the same time, these individuals may be eligible for other programs that provide a steady source of support: individuals that lost a job may have access to the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program, while individuals with limited income and assets may collect in-kind transfers from Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) . An open question is the extent to which these programs make delayed Social Security claiming more realistic for vulnerable potential beneficiaries.
The structure of the programs and the circumstances of their potential beneficiaries make answering this question a challenge. First, while the anticipated effect for UI is relatively clearto get UI a person often needs to be looking for work, and this typically means delaying retirement and delaying claiming of Social Security -the roles played by Medicaid and SNAP are more ambiguous. On the one hand, both programs provide an individual with necessities that would otherwise need to be purchased, likely with income from Social Security. Furthermore, both programs generally count Social Security income against eligibility requirements. Both these facts suggest that Medicaid and SNAP may delay claiming. On the other hand, the application itself may trigger a Social Security application if the state requires Medicaid applicants to avail themselves of alternative income sources as part of the applicationeffectively requiring applicants to claim Social Security -as several states do. This requirement could lead to earlier claiming.
Of course, if the only issue was the ambiguity of these programs' effects on claiming, a simple empirical analysis could clear it up -for example, tabulating data to determine if individuals eligible for UI, Medicaid or SNAP or individuals with higher expected benefits from these programs claim their Social Security benefits earlier. But individuals who are eligible for these programs have, by definition, found themselves at older ages with limited income and, in the case of Medicaid and SNAP, with few assets. This fact means that eligible individuals are not directly comparable to non-eligible individuals, because eligibles' dire economic straits may make them more likely to claim benefits from both Social Security and these programs, generating a misleading correlation between Social Security claiming and temporary assistance.
We resolve this endogeneity by constructing an instrument for each program that is correlated with the generosity or availability of the program but not with the circumstances surrounding the individual's own claiming decision.
The paper uses the 1992 through 2012 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) linked to restricted geographic identifiers to examine the relationship between Social Security and these temporary assistance programs. The first step is to divide the HRS sample into two subsamples of 61-70 year old individuals who are eligible to claim Social Security retirement benefits and may be eligible to participate in these programs: 1) the "UI sample" consisting of individuals who were employed in the prior wave but have since become unemployed; and 2) the "SNAP and Medicaid sample" consisting of individuals who have both limited income and assets. Although the samples are not mutually exclusive, dividing the sample in this way is an important first step because the UI sample is generally representative of the broader population while the SNAP and Medicaid samples are much less educated, poorer, and less likely to be employed recently. The next step is to construct instruments for each program. The project calculates simulated benefit levels for UI and SNAP and simulated eligibility for Medicaid, using a technique based on Currie and Gruber (1996) and Cutler and Gruber (1996) . These simulated benefit and eligibility levels reflect state-level variation in program rules but not differences in the individual characteristics that may drive claiming. The final step is to place the instrument(s) into two-stage least squares regression models run separately for the two samples. In these models, the first stage uses the instruments to predict a person's potential benefit level or eligibility, and the second stage models the decision to claim Social Security as a function of demographic and financial characteristics together with the predicted UI or SNAP benefit and Medicaid eligibility from the first stage. This second stage relies on variance in claiming age, but fortunately, as Figures 1 and 2 show, 53 percent of the UI sample and 57 percent of the Medicaid/SNAP sample delay claiming past age 62 -lower than the average for the full population, but far from clustering entirely at 62.
The results suggest that UI does not have a statistically significant effect on claiming decisions, though, as expected, the sign of the effect is consistent with delayed claiming. In contrast, Medicaid may actually encourage earlier claiming and the effect is statistically significant. This counterintuitive estimate may be the result of states encouraging Medicaid applicants to apply for their Social Security benefits -either as an actual condition of application or simply by suggesting it to applicants to help them maximize their sources of support. Indeed, at least seven states explicitly make availing oneself of other potential sources of income a condition of applications to Medicaid. The results for SNAP indicate no significant effect, perhaps because SNAP take-up rates in older households tend to be quite low: only about onethird of eligible households ages 65 and older report receiving benefits (Wu 2010).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses background on the three programs considered and how they relate to Social Security retirement benefit claiming. The third section discusses the relevant literature, the fourth section describes the empirical approach, and the fifth section outlines the results. The final section concludes that changes in the UI and SNAP programs are unlikely to influence the timing of Social Security claiming. Expanded Medicaid eligibility may lead to earlier claiming, but this is likely only to the extent that states encourage (or require) applicants to pursue every available source of income.
Background on Temporary Assistance Programs
The three programs covered in this paper all serve to provide consumption smoothing to individuals who find themselves in a period without income, or to increase income when existing household resources are insufficient to support themselves. However, the three programs serve very different populations and interact with Social Security in different ways. Regarding this paper, two aspects of each program are important: 1) how the program interacts with Social Security retirement benefits and how it might affect claiming; and 2) how benefits and eligibility vary from state to state, which ultimately feeds into construction of the instruments.
Unemployment Insurance (UI)
Most workers who lose a job involuntarily and without cause are eligible for unemployment benefits.
1 Importantly, these benefits are typically received with the It is worth noting that the substantial interaction between the Medicaid program and Social Security's Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program because, in many states, an application for SSI is jointly an application for Medicaid. However, this interaction is of minimal importance in this paper. Our analysis focuses only on individuals who are eligible for Social Security retirement benefits and who do not use Disability Insurance (SSI recipients who are eligible for Social Security retirement benefits will also receive Social Security Disability Insurance until the Full Retirement Age, so they do not have a claiming decision). This restriction likely eliminates any individuals on SSI under age 65. 5 To identify these states, a thorough internet search was conducted using the terms "potential income" and "Medicaid" or "Medicaid application" separately for each of the 50 states. In addition to searching state websites, phone calls were placed to the Medicaid offices of several states, including Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, California, Iowa, Illinois, and Texas. However, these calls did not produce any information on this policy some with large populations -tie Medicaid application to Social Security claiming will need to be kept in mind when interpreting results.
In addition to the treatment of potential income, state Medicaid programs differ in other ways. The most important source of variation is the treatment of childless adults. Prior to the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the majority of states did not provide any Medicaid coverage for non-disabled individuals under age 65 without dependent children. For example, in 2010, 27
states provided no Medicaid coverage at all to childless adults, and this number of states was even higher in the 1990s. For most of the individuals in our sample, getting Medicaid in these states is out of the question. However, even for individuals in states that cover childless adults (or for individuals in our sample with children), states also differ considerably in the maximum level of income an individual can have to remain eligible for Medicaid, typically measured relative to the Federal Poverty Line (FPL). Finally, some states do not have an asset test and those that do differ in the exact level making one ineligible. This variation is useful in the construction of the eligibility instrument because an individual may be eligible in one state but not in another, and the difference in eligibility will be independent of their individual propensity to claim Social Security.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
The final program considered is SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, which is federally funded except for administrative costs financed by the state. Like Medicaid, SNAP benefits are subject to an income test and SNAP counts Social Security retirement benefits as income. Generally, SNAP imposes two kinds of income tests on recipients: 1) a gross income test that requires households have gross income less than 130 percent of the FPL; and 2) a net income test that requires net income fall below 100 percent of the FPL. However, for households containing individuals over age 60 (the entirety of the sample being analyzed in this paper), only the net income test applies. SNAP allows several deductions from gross income to arrive at net income, but not a deduction for Social Security income. Similar to Medicaid, the expected effect of SNAP would be to delay Social Security claiming, which would lead to losing access to SNAP.
beyond the web search and so were discontinued. Finally, the Kaiser Family Foundation was contacted to see if any retrospective data on this practice exists and it does not.
Wu (2010) because those that do phased it in over time, it provides an excellent source of variation for use in this study. In addition to BBCE, the paper exploits the variance among state tax codes in their definitions of "net income" and, thus, eligibility.
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Relevant Literature
The focus of this paper is on the individual's decision to claim Social Security given that he is not employed or employed at very low levels of income. While it may be expected that many of these individuals claim Social Security at the EEA, previous research has recognized that the decision to claim Social Security is not necessarily tied to employment status (whether unemployed, retired, or working at low wages) and can be delayed to optimize the benefit stream even when someone is no longer working (e.g., Coile et al. 2002) . While this research has generally recognized that an individual's net worth, marital status, number of children, and health might influence the claiming decision, it has not focused on the availability or generosity of temporary government assistance programs. This lack of research is despite the fact that these benefits could impact the timing of claiming. UI benefits can be substantial -the average benefit is $1,200 per month (Stone and Chen 2013), slightly less than the average Social Security retirement benefit of $1,261 (SSA 2013) -suggesting that workers should delay claiming as long as they can maintain requirements (such as job search activity) to continue receiving UI benefits. While SNAP benefit payments are relatively small compared to UI, past research indicates that many Social Security beneficiaries rely on SNAP before claiming (Coe and Wu 2015) . Further, Coe and Wu (2015) find suggestive evidence that not all SNAP beneficiaries claim retirement benefits at the EEA, meaning people may be using these benefits as a bridge to claim later.
Unlike the effect of these programs on claiming, past research has explored the impact of temporary assistance programs on other outcomes, like re-employment or enrollment in disability programs. The results suggest the programs can play a role in individual decision making. For example, Rutledge (2012) found that during periods of UI extensions, jobless individuals were less likely to apply for disability insurance. In other recent work, Lindner and Nichols (2015) found that increased access to UI benefits decreased the likelihood someone applied for disability insurance, while SNAP increased applications for SSI. Indeed, the Linder and Nichols approach is similar to our own, in that they used state-level variation in UI and SNAP as instruments. The difference between their work and ours is three-fold: 1) while they focused on enrollment in Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and SSI, we focus on Social Security claiming; 2) their instrumentation approach does not use simulated benefits but rather uses specific program parameters as predictors of participation (e.g., for UI, the maximum benefit or, for SNAP, whether immigrants are eligible); and 3) they did not consider Medicaid.
In the work closest to this paper, Coile and Levine (2007) 
Data and Instrumentation
The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between UI and SNAP benefits, percent of the FPL, and nearly every household that qualifies has assets in the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution, so we limit the sample to individuals below these two thresholds. The resulting Medicaid/SNAP sample has 1,005 members.
The analysis is conducted separately for the UI and Medicaid/SNAP samples to reflect the fact that individuals affected by these two programs are largely disjointed. 11 Of the two samples, as Table 1 shows, , the UI sample more closely resembles the full HRS sample of nondisabled individuals eligible for OASI in terms of income, assets, education, and race. On the other hand, individuals in the Medicaid/SNAP sample are less educated, have much less wealth (in part because of program rules), are more likely to be non-white and in poor health, and had less income in their first year in the HRS relative to the total sample. This study limits the analysis to individuals potentially eligible for the programs, because including people who are not close to eligibility would bias the results in favor of finding no relationship between the programs and Social Security claiming. But because the sample is also limited to individuals 9 SSDI and SSI might also be used to delay OASI claiming, because individuals with health conditions that limit their ability to work are eligible to apply up to their FRA. But many individuals applying for SSDI and SSI after age 62 may do so only because they have already claimed OASI -if, at their visit to the SSA office to claim retirement benefits, they report retiring because of health limitations, SSA staff may inform them of the option to apply to SSDI and, if they also have low incomes and assets, SSI. The extent to which they receive OASI income while waiting for their disability application to be evaluated is unclear. 10 As Figure 1 (discussed above) shows, many people in this sample do not claim Social Security immediately at age 62. Furthermore, of individuals experiencing a job separation after age 62, just 18 percent claim Social Security within a year's time. 11 Only 109 individuals appear in both samples.
recently leaving a job or with low income and assets, all results should be interpreted in the context of these two populations. Similarly, Medicaid eligibility shows large variation in the simulated share eligible, ranging from 6.4 percent in New Hampshire to 43.5 percent in Arizona. As Table 2b shows, the simulated share eligible for Medicaid depends crucially on whether childless adults are covered. Finally, Table 2c shows that SNAP ranges from a maximum annual benefit of $871 a year in Hawaii to a low of $265 in Wyoming, and this variation is largely a function of whether the state uses an asset test (because individuals who are ineligible have a $0 benefit, which is included in the average).
Empirical Approach
The empirical approach is a standard two-stage least squares regression. The framework is a discrete-time hazard regression in which Social Security-eligible individuals are included in the sample starting at age 61 (and can thus claim the next year) and in each year until they claim Social Security (or exit the sample for another reason). 13 Each additional year gives the individual a new opportunity to claim and exit the sample or not claim and continue. In the absence of the endogeneity problem, the decision to claim Social Security retirement benefits in each calendar year t would be a function of an individual's potential UI benefit (in the UI sample) or the SNAP benefit and Medicaid eligibility (in the Medicaid/UI sample):
12 The underlying assumption is that people do not move to a state to take advantage of its eligibility rules or benefit levels in a way that is also correlated with the age at which they might claim Social Security. 13 We also estimate regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for having claimed at 62 or before their FRA, but the results are similar. However, an individual's potential benefit is likely to be correlated with other characteristics that make him likely to claim early, requiring an instrument to account for the endogeneity.
17 Thus, equations (1) and (2) are used as the second stage in a two-stage least squared regression, where the first stage is:
14 The model converts the HRS into annual observations, but uses information about monthly job loss to calculate the UI benefits available to that individual in the calendar year. In the absence of an extension, UI is only available for six months in most states, although the level of monthly benefit varies substantially across states. To address the concern that the extension of the UI benefit duration may be correlated with the state economy, and thus affect the individual's decision to claim Social Security, the project will ignore extensions; that is, UI it is equal to six times the monthly benefit in that state unless the state offers more than 26 months of benefits. The project assumes that SNAP is used for the full year, so SNAP it is equal to the potential monthly benefit times 12. 15 The benefit calculation uses annual income, as monthly income is unavailable. 16 Furthermore, Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009) report that UI and SNAP receipt is undercounted in self-reported surveys relative to administrative totals, while Card, Hildreth, and Shore-Sheppard (2001) find a similar results for Medicaid. Using potential income or eligibility rather than self-reported benefits received diminishes the effect of undercounting. 17 In addition, McGarry (1996) suggests that an instrumental variables technique can reduce the bias from mismeasurement of program eligibility and receipt.
where SimulatedBen is the instrumental variable for one of the three assistance programs. For the Medicaid program, the project will use simulated eligibility rather than the benefit level. In the second stage, the predicted temporary assistance benefit levels for UI and SNAP, and the predicted eligibility status for Medicare, from equation (3) are substituted into equation (1) or (2) in place of the potential benefit or eligibility. Importantly, the predicted benefit varies with an individual's state of residence but is not a function of any unobserved individual attributes that may cause them to claim early.
Results
The results are presented for Unemployment Insurance in Table 3a and for Medicaid and SNAP in Table 3b . The results are presented for both the un-instrumented equations (1) and (2) and for the two-stage least squares result, which replaces the individuals' potential benefit or eligibility with its predicted counterpart from equation (3).
Unemployment Insurance
The results in each model used show little evidence of a relationship between UI and Social Security claiming. In the un-instrumented linear probability model (LPM) for UI (first column), the coefficient on the UI benefit is negative but small and statistically insignificant; the coefficient suggests a $1,000 increase in yearly UI benefits reduces the claiming probability by just 0.4 percentage points, and the standard error is too large to rule out no effect. After instrumenting to account for the potential endogeneity of the individual claiming decision with respect to UI, the second-stage coefficient on UI (third column) is similarly statistically insignificant, albeit slightly smaller at 0.2. The TSLS result is similar, despite the strength of the first stage: the coefficient on simulated UI benefit is statistically significant, and the F-statistic for the first stage is 2,112.4 (a p-value of essentially zero), which indicates the instrument is strong.
The other coefficients are consistent between the LPM and TSLS models. Relative to age 62, the claiming hazard is statistically significantly lower at each age except 65, where it is slightly (but statistically insignificantly) higher. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the linear time trend reflects evidence that claiming ages have increased in recent years (Munnell and Chen 2015) . Non-whites and individuals in states with high unemployment rates claim later, but claiming does not differ by income or wealth.
The TSLS result, despite the strong instrument, suggests little evidence that claiming is delayed by the receipt of UI income. This finding echoes Coile and Levine's (2007) finding of a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between retirement and UI in a slightly younger age range (55-64).
Medicaid and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
The Medicaid and SNAP results in Table 3b also provide little evidence that temporary assistance programs help low-income individuals postpone Social Security claiming -and in the case of Medicaid benefits, they may, if anything, hasten retirement benefit claiming.
The first column presents the results from the un-instrumented LPM. Neither SNAP nor
Medicaid has a statistically significant correlation with Social Security claiming, and both estimates are very small relative to the mean annual probability of claiming (17.6 percent). The other coefficients are similar to the UI results. The probability of claiming the retirement benefit is highest at ages 62 and 65, though the hazard rate at any given age has been declining over time Security claiming decision among low-income individuals, a higher simulated probability of being eligible for Medicaid is associated with a higher probability of claiming in any given year.
This result is statistically significant and substantively large: the coefficient indicates that a 10-percent increase in Medicaid eligibility would make an individual 1.8 percent more likely to claim Social Security in a given year.
On the other hand, the evidence is entirely lacking that older individuals holding off on OASI claiming use SNAP as a source of support. The SNAP benefit level has a statistically insignificant and small coefficient in both the LPM and TSLS estimates. This result is not that surprising, given the low take-up rates among older households (Wu 2010).
The positive coefficient on Medicaid is somewhat counterintuitive -Medicaid, it seems, would allow individuals to delay claiming, because they would not need as much income to cover their health expenses. But evidence exists that at least seven states require Social Security be collected if a Medicaid application is to be accepted. To the extent more states use similar provisions, expanding access to Medicaid would actually induce people to apply for Medicaid and thereby be required to collect Social Security. It is also possible that Medicaid offices encourage individuals to apply for SSI, a program that in many states has eligibility requirements identical to Medicaid, and in doing so encourage individuals to claim OASI benefits while they wait for their SSI applications to be evaluated. While this may explain the positive relationship, the information available on these potential income and referral policies is limited. Further research is needed into the prevalence of these policies beyond the seven states identified above.
Conclusion
While temporary assistance programs would seemingly have the potential to encourage delayed Social Security claiming, this paper finds little evidence of such a relationship. The only conclusive result is for Medicaid -and it suggests the opposite of the expected relationship.
Individuals who are eligible for Medicaid are more likely to claim Social Security in a given year. The implication is that the ongoing expansion of Medicaid, through the ACA, could put pressure on older Americans to claim Social Security benefits earlier, provided that some states continue to require Medicaid applicants to apply for Social Security. Further research is required to determine whether these state policies continued during the recent Medicaid expansions. This information -which, to our knowledge, is not currently collected by any government agency, private research institution, or researcher -will also help to determine whether the relationship between claiming and Medicaid application is positive even in states that do not explicitly require Social Security claiming; the relationship may still be positive if welfare offices make potential recipients aware of their eligibility.
The bottom line in this analysis is that the three temporary assistance programs -UI, Medicaid, and SNAP -exhibit no evidence that they enable older individuals to delay their Social Security claim. The results in this paper suggest that further expansions of these programs are unlikely to change claiming in any substantial way. 
